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WHY DID THE ANTITRUST AGENCIES EMBRACE
UNILATERAL EFFECTS?
Jonathan B. Baker*
INTRODUCTION
When Judge Richard Posner upheld the Federal Trade Commission
challenge to a hospital merger in 1986,1 he emphasized the threat of coor-
dinated competitive effects. Posner explained that the "ultimate issue" in
the antitrust review of mergers is "whether the challenged acquisition is
likely to hurt consumers, as by making it easier for firms to collude, ex-
pressly or tacitly, and thereby force price above or farther above the com-
petitive level."2 The Justice Department Merger Guidelines in force during
most of the 1980s similarly highlighted a concern with coordinated com-
petitive effects.3
Within a decade, the primary focus of merger reviews at the federal
antitrust enforcement agencies had changed. According to Charles James,
the first Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust in the current administra-
tion, "one interesting side-effect of the 1992 [Horizontal Merger] Guide-
lines has been the emergence of unilateral effects as the predominant theory
of economic harm pursued in government merger investigations and chal-
lenges."4 Still, coordination has not been entirely eclipsed as a concern
* Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American University. The author is grateful to
Andrew Dick and Bruce Owen.
I Hosp. Corp. ofAm. v. Fed. Trade Comm 'n, 807 F.2d. 1381 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.).
2 Id. at 1386.
3 U.S. Dep't of Justice Merger Guidelines § IIL.C (1982), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
13,102; U.S. Dep't of Justice Merger Guidelines § 3 (1984), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
13,103.
4 Charles A. James, Rediscovering Coordinated Effects (Aug. 13, 2002), available at
http://www.usdoj.govatr/public/speeches/2001 2 4 .htm. Other senior government officials have made
similar observations. William J. Kolasky, Coordinated Effects in Merger Review: From Dead French-
men to Beautiful Minds and Mavericks (Apr. 24, 2002), available at
http:/lwww.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/l 1050.htm ("Since the issuance of the 1992 Horizontal
Merger Guidelines, both the FTC and the Division have placed increased reliance on unilateral effects
theories to challenge horizontal mergers and have brought fewer coordinated effects cases."); Jonathan
B. Baker, Unilateral Competitive Effects Theories in Merger Analysis, II ANTITRUST 21 (Spring 1997)
(Unilateral theories have become "by far the most common in the internal analyses of the antitrust
enforcement agencies, particularly among agency economists.").
GEO. MASON L. REv.
among government enforcers or in agency litigation.' Indeed, antitrust en-
forcement agency interest in coordinated competitive effects theories is
now on the rise.
6
I. POLITICS AND THE RISE OF UNILATERAL EFFECTS
Why did the unilateral competitive effects of merger capture the atten-
tion of enforcement agency economists during the late 1980s and 1990s?
Stuart Gurrea and Bruce Owen view the agency attention to unilateral ef-
fects as importantly "political."7 The agencies, they suggest, when led by
"aggressive enforcers"-apparently a reference to the most recent Democ-
ratic administration--and frustrated by a series of losses in merger litiga-
tion, latched on to unilateral theories "because they are more readily found
in proposed transactions than are coordinated interaction effects."9
The political explanation for the rise of unilateral effects analysis at
the agencies is unconvincing, for two reasons. First, the political theory is
inconsistent with the timing of agency interest in unilateral effects. Unilat-
eral effects analysis was accepted by the antitrust agencies before the De-
mocrats took charge of the Executive Branch in 1993; its introduction into
the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines reflected then-current agency en-
forcement practice.'" Moreover, recent commentary associated with the
current Republican administration emphasizes continuity in federal agency
enforcement norms during the last two decades, regardless of the political
party in charge of the Executive Branch-implicitly locating Clinton era
antitrust enforcement as within the modem mainstream, and not as unusu-
ally aggressive. 1 Second, it would be surprising if the antitrust agencies did
5 David A. Balto, The History of Coordinated Interaction in Merger Enforcement, 12 GEO.
MASON L. REV. (forthcoming 2003).
6 Charles A. James, Rediscovering Coordinated Effects (Aug. 13, 2002), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/200124.htm; William J. Kolasky, Coordinated Effects in
Merger Review: From Dead Frenchmen to Beautiful Minds and Mavericks (April 24, 2002), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/l1050.htm; David T. Scheffinan & Mary Coleman, Quan-
titative Analyses of Potential Competitive Effects from a Merger, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. (forthcoming
2003).
7 Stuart D. Gurrea & Bruce M. Owen, Coordinated Interaction and Clayton § 7 Enforcement, 12
GEO. MASON L. REV. 89 (2003).
8 Id. Although Gurrea and Owen tie unilateral effects analysis to the 1990s, they do not specifi-
cally identify the enforcers they have in mind or explain why they view some antitrust enforcers as more
aggressive than others.
9 Id.
10 U.S. Dep't of Justice & FTC, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 2.2 (1992), reprinted in 4 Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13, 104 [hereinafter Horizontal Merger Guidelines].
11 William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy Enforcement Norms, 71
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not seek to employ new theories and methodologies developed and ac-
cepted by economists for identifying the harmful competitive effects of
mergers-even if it meant that anticompetitive transactions were found in
places where the government had not looked previously (as with unilateral
theories).12
II. ECONOMICS AND THE RISE OF UNILATERAL EFFECTS
This comment provides an alternative explanation for agency interest
in unilateral effects during the 1990s that highlights improvements in
economists' toolkits rather than political demands for more aggressive en-
forcement. Two economic developments during the previous decade
brought attention to unilateral theories. The first was a theoretical literature
that investigated the conditions under which oligopolists would find merger
profitable even if the industry members were not coordinating their interac-
tions.13 This literature was influential in helping economists understand
how and when a unilateral theory involving merger among sellers of homo-
ANTITRUST L.J. 377 (2003); Thomas B. Leary, The Essential Stability of Merger Policy in the U.S., 70
ANTITRUST L.J. 105 (2002); Timothy J. Muris, Antitrust Enforcement at the Federal Trade Commis-
sion: In a Word-Continuity (Aug. 7, 2001), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/murisaba.htm. Antitrust enforcement underwent a sea change with
the Chicago school revolution, beginning during the late 1970s, but this dramatic change in perspective
affected enforcers of all political stripes; see generally, Jonathan B. Baker, A Preface to Post-Chicago
Antitrust, in POST-CHICAGO DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTITRUST ANALYSts 60 (Roger van den Bergh,
Roberto Pardolesi and Antonio Cucinotta, eds., 2002). The most significant deviation from the recent
enforcement consensus was not during the Clinton administration. It was instead the relatively non-
interventionist attitude of the federal agencies during the second term of the Reagan administration. See
Eleanor Fox & Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust Policy, in CHANGING AMERICA: BLUEPRINTS FOR THE NEW
ADMINISTRATION 319 (Mark Green ed., 1992).
12 Enforcers in different administrations may raise or lower the evidentiary bar for proving certain
theories. For example, enforcement officials in the current Republican administration have questioned
the probative value of certain types of empirical evidence sometimes employed to demonstrate unilat-
eral effects. E.g. DANIEL HOSKEN, DANIEL O'BRIEN, DAVID SCIEFFMAN & MICHAEL VITA, DEMAND
SYSTEM ESTIMATION AND ITS APPLICATION TO HORIZONTAL MERGER ANALYSIS (FTC, Working Paper
No. 246, 2002). But the logic and soundness of the theories themselves is not a policy question. Pre-
sumably for that reason, the same officials have not questioned the economic logic of the unilateral
theory itself, or removed it from the Merger Guidelines.
13 See, e.g., Stephen W. Salant et al., Losses from Horizontal Merger: The Effects of an Exoge-
nous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium, 98 Q.J. ECON. 185 (1983); Raymond
Deneckere & Carl Davidson, Incentives to Form Coalitions with Bertrand Competition, 16 RAND J.
ECON. 473 (1985); Martin K. Perry & Robert H. Porter, Oligopoly and the Incentive for Horizontal
Merger, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 219 (1985); Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Horizontal Mergers: An Equi-
librium Analysis, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 107 (1990).
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geneous products would apply beyond the creation of a dominant firm. 14
The second, and probably more important, development was the growth of
empirical literature creating and applying new methodologies for measuring
market power.15 These new methodologies became particularly useful for
analyzing the loss of localized competition among sellers of differentiated
products, the most common unilateral theory of adverse competitive effects
of mergers," with the growing availability of computerized point-of-sale
scanner data for recording individual transactions at supermarkets and other
retail outlets.' 7 By the time the 1992 Merger Guidelines were drafted,
agency economists had accepted the unilateral model as a useful analytic
framework and were developing and employing methodologies for estimat-
ing the extent to which buyers consider individual products to be close sub-
stitutes; the extent to which, in consequence, one firm's products constrain
the pricing of rival products; and the extent to which a merger among rivals
would lead to higher prices by removing those constraints. 8 Similarly,
14 Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 2.22; Robert D. Willig, Merger Analysis, Industrial Organiza-
tion Theory, and Merger Guidelines, 1991 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 281, 293-99
(1991).
15 The first empirical study of which I am aware that demonstrated that it was practical to estimate
the magnitude of the loss of localized competition from merger among sellers of differentiated products
and simulate the effects of merger was published in 1985 (and circulated earlier in working paper form).
See Jonathan B. Baker & Timothy F. Bresnahan, The Gains from Merger or Collusion in Product-
Differentiated Industries, 33 J. INDUS. ECON. 427 (1985). Other approaches followed. E.g. Steven Berry
& Ariel Pakcs, Some Applications and Limitations of Recent Advances in Empirical Industrial Organi-
zation: Merger Analysis, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 247 (1993); Jerry Hausman et al., Competitive Analysis
with Differentiated Products, 34 ANNALES D'EcONOMIE ET DE STATISTIQUE 159 (1994); Gregory
Werden & Luke Froeb, The Effects of Mergers in Differentiated Products Industries: Logit Demand and
Merger Policy, 10 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 407 (1994); Aviv Nevo, Mergers with Differentiated Products:
The Case of the Ready-to-Eat Cereal Idustry, 31 RAND J. ECON. 395 (2000). For a recent survey of
empirical methods used in antitrust, see Jonathan B. Baker & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Empirical Methods
in Antitrust Litigation: Review and Critique, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 386 (1999).
16 Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 2.21. The theory itself was implicit in familiar economic mod-
els of monpolistic competition that predated the modem era of antitrust enforcement. It had been ig-
nored in antitrust practice, presumably because of measurement difficulties, but the development of new
empirical techniques for analyzing market power removed this excuse for not taking differentiation
seriously. Cf Timothy J. Muris, Antitrust Enforcement at the Federal Trade Commission: In a Word-
Continuity, supra note 11 ("[A]lthough we have always had what could be called 'unilateral effects'
theories, they have evolved, and they have been more widely applied since the 1992 revision of the
[Merger] Guidelines.").
17 Unilateral competitive effects analysis has been particularly important for analyzing mergers
among sellers of branded consumer products, where scanner data is often available for analysis and
localized competition may be significant.
18 Econometric evidence can be valuable but it also can be challenging to develop and present
persuasively in court. A host of statistical and modeling issues often must be addressed, and the results
are not always easy to interpret. The litigation challenges associated with proof of loss of localized
competition have led to a revival of interest in submarkets, Jonathan B. Baker, Stepping Out in an Old
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former Assistant Attorney General James attributes the recent importance
of unilateral effects analysis in government investigations in part to "the
belief by many economists that unilateral price changes resulting from
mergers can be predicted and demonstrated empirically."' 9
Agency economists in particular found unilateral theories attractive,
and not solely because they could take advantage of new empirical tools
and newly-available sources of data to measure the competitive effects.
Economic training places a premium on developing a fully specified and
logically consistent theory that derives outcomes from the rational behavior
of individual actors. During the 1980s, the research literature became
"committed to the conceptual framework of game theory," leading to the
association of coordination with "a particular class of equilibria in super-
games" while other forms of oligopolistic conduct had distinct representa-
tions.2 ° From within this framework, the consequences of merger have been
most readily understood when oligopolies interacted without coordination.
Assistant Attorney General James has similarly noted that coordinated ef-
fects analysis "can be perceived to be less determinate than the types of
effects predicted under unilateral theory."' Accordingly, a methodological
commitment to a fully specified and logically consistent theory provides a
possible, though largely unarticulated, distinction between unilateral and
coordinated theories that may have influenced economists to favor the uni-
lateral approaches.
Put differently, if the facts support a unilateral theory, it is clear as a
matter of economic logic why the particular merger would likely lead to
higher prices. Before the merger, the price a merging firm charged for a
particular product was held in check by the collective presence of competi-
tion from the products of rivals, including those of its merger partner, that
were second choices for a significant fraction of buyers. That constraint is
removed by merger, giving the firm an incentive to raise prices.2 2 The
Brown Shoe: In Qualified Praise of Submarkets, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 203 (2000).
19 Charles A. James, Rediscovering Coordinated Effects (Aug. 13, 2002), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/200124.htm. In contrast, James continues, "There is no corre-
sponding set of predictive tools for coordinated effects." Id.
20 Robert D. Willig, Merger Analysis, Industrial Organization Theory, and Merger Guidelines,
supra note 14 at 291.
21 Charles A. James, Rediscovering Coordinated Effects (Aug. 13, 2002), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/200124.html. But cf. Timothy Bresnahan, Comments on
"Reforning European Merger Review: Targeting Problem Areas in Policy Outcomes" by Kai-Uwe
Kuhn (Nov. 26, 2002), available at http://www/stanford.edu/-tbres/research.htm (rigorous evidence of
coordinated competitive effects can be qualitative and anecdotal).
22 For a hypothetical numerical illustration, see Jonathan B. Baker, Unilateral Competitive Effects
Theories in Merger Analysis, II ANTITRUST 21, 23 (1997). This theory does not make all mergers
2003]
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mechanism by which prices are led to rise is made clear by the theory. By
contrast, the mechanism by which a merger would make coordination more
likely or more effective is less apparent. The most common explanation that
with fewer sellers in a market, coordination is more likely is a widely ac-
cepted empirical observation about probabilities. But this empirical regular-
ity cannot explain why any particular merger is harmful, or distinguish
those acquisitions in concentrated markets that would make coordination
more likely from those that would not.23 In short, the reason prices rise
from merger under the unilateral story is clear to economists in a way that
the received learning on the way a merger may facilitate coordination,
however general its acceptance, is not.
III. LESSONS FOR THE REVIVAL OF COORDINATED EFFECTS
The recent agency interest in coordination challenges industrial or-
ganization economists in two ways. The first problem is to clarify the theo-
retical foundations for coordinated competitive effects, that is, to explain
persuasively why and how a particular change in asset ownership, a merger,
alters the ability or effectiveness of coordination.2 4 One possible answer,
mentioned in passing in the Merger Guidelines, involves the possibility that
the merger involves the loss of a "maverick" firm (which had previously
constrained industry coordination), or otherwise affects the maverick's in-
centives to limit the degree to which coordinated outcomes approach what
appear to harm competition; defenses may include ease of entry, repositioning by rivals, and efficien-
cies.
23 Jonathan B. Baker, Mavericks. Mergers, and Exclusion: Proving Coordinated Competitive
Effects Under the Antitrust Laws, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 135, 139-40 (2002); Charles A. James, Rediscover-
ing Coordinated Effects (Aug. 13, 2002), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/200124.htm (Coordinated competitive effects analysis in the
Merger Guidelines "does not do as much as some might like to determine why maintaining the inde-
pendence of one of the specific parties to the proposed transaction is an important enough constraint
upon coordinated interaction to justify a challenge."); see William J. Kolasky, Coordinated Effects in
Merger Review: From Dead Frenchmen to Beautiful Minds and Mavericks (Apr. 24, 2002) available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/l 1050.htm ("[N]either the theoretical nor the empirical litera-
ture tells us much at all about whether the disappearance of a single firm through merger will increase
the likelihood of coordination, other than, perhaps, in the extreme case where a merger reduces the
number of firms in a market from three to two.").
24 See Charles A. James, Rediscovering Coordinated Effects (Aug. 13, 2002) available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/200124.htm (discussing research effort to explain "why does
this particular merger matter" in order to help the Justice Department "focus more directly on how
individual firms affect the competitive dynamic in a market and how their elimination through merger
may impact upon the likelihood of coordination").
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would arise from joint-profit maximization among the rivals in a market. 25
Gurrea and Owen intriguingly pursue what can be learned from behavior
economics and experimental economics, to fill the same void.2" The second
problem is to identify types of empirical evidence that might bear on proof
of coordinated competitive effects of mergers among rivals. The forthcom-
ing article by David Scheffman and Mary Coleman, the senior antitrust
economists at the F.T.C., represents an interesting attempt to do so.
27
This effort by economists, in the agencies and the academy, is critical
to the current revival of coordinated competitive effects analysis of merg-
ers. Unilateral effects became important with improvements to economists
toolkits. Similarly, the long-term success of the renewed interest in coordi-
nated competitive effects can be expected to turn primarily on develop-
ments in the tools and theories used by economists, not on shifting political
winds.
25 Jonathan B. Baker, Mavericks, Mergers, and Exclusion: Proving Coordinated Competitive
Effects Under the Antitrust Laws, supra note 23.
26 Stuart D. Gurrea & Bruce M. Owen, Coordinated Interaction and Clayton § 7 Enforcement,
supra note 7.
27 David T. Scheffman & Mary Coleman, Quantitative Analyses of Potential Competitive Effects
from a Merger, supra note 6.
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